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Many scholars have emphasised community resistance to locally sited wind 
energy schemes in their explanations of wind power planning outcomes and 
deployment rates, while others have questioned the impact of local objectors. To 
illuminate ways in which local protestors attempt to influence decisions over the 
siting of wind turbines, and the efficacy of their efforts, we compare four cases 
of anti-windfarm protest in England. Local protestors employ community 
mobilisation and direct argumentation in attempting to influence local authority 
decisionmaking. At this level, mobilisation is effective, not only bringing 
political pressure to bear on elected decisionmakers, but also helping local 
groups to raise money to hire experts and professional advocates.  At public 
inquiries protestors have some influence through the supporting role they play 
to more significant objectors, notably local authorities, but may also influence 
outcomes through informal contacts preceding public inquiries. 
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The imperatives of climate change and energy security have focused the attention of 
governments around the world on developing renewable energy. In the UK, successive 
administrations have made wind central to their renewable energy strategies, not least 
because of the countryÕs plentiful wind resources and the technical and commercial viability 
of wind technology. Though exploitation of wind energy in the UK has grown greatly, total 
installed capacity increasing from 552MW in 2002 to over 10,000MW by early 2014 (GWEC 
2012; RenewableUK 2014b), it has grown more slowly than in other European states with 
significantly fewer wind resources (Toke et al. 2008).  Some analysts have sought to explain 
the UKÕs relative underperformance in terms of low levels of public acceptance but, since at 
least the mid-2000s, polls have consistently found 70-80% support for wind energy 
(Sustainable Development Commission 2005; GWEC 2009; RenewableUK 2014a). This 
diffuse public support-in-principle is, however, in contrast to frequent opposition to proposed 
windfarms among local communities faced with the prospect of hosting them (GWEC 2010; 
Cowell 2007; Toke 2005; Szarka and Blhdorn 2006; Toke et al. 2008; Wolsink 2007; Bell et 
al. 2005, 2013).   
Public resistance to the siting of wind energy developments is neither novel nor 
unique to the UK. Indeed, since the mid-1980s (Gipe 1995, ch. 8) a growing body of research 
has emerged which aims to understand societal reactions to the deployment of wind energy 
and renewables infrastructure generally. This research can be divided into two broad areas: 
studies focusing on understanding public attitudes, and research into deployment and 
planning outcomes (Jobert et al. 2007).   
Research on public attitudes has drawn attention to a number of factors influencing 
negative perceptions of (proposed) wind energy developments, ranging from demographic  
(age, gender and social class) through knowledge, values, and perceptions of fairness, to 
contextual variables (technology type and scale, institutional structures, and spatial factors).
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By contrast, outcomes research has predominantly focused on ÔinstitutionalÕ-level 
explanations (Toke et al. 2008): planning systems (Szarka and Blhdorn, 2006; Pepermans 
and Lootes 2013), types of ownership and opportunities to participate (Breukers and Wolsink 
2007; Breukers 2006), the prevalence and types of community (pro and anti) networks 
(Loring 2007), and broader cultural factors (Toke et al. 2008).   
These two bodies of work have provided important insights into the social and 
political issues surrounding the development of windfarms. However, with exceptions 
(Bomberg and McEwen 2012), there has been limited research into the dynamics and impacts 
of protest campaigns against windfarms, which is surprising given the frequent 
acknowledgement that oppositional networks that mobilise around proposed developments 
shape both local attitudes and outcomes (Toke 2005; Loring 2007). This view has not, 
however, gone uncontested.  
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 For reviews of determinants of public attitudes see Devine-Wright (2005; 2008), Gross (2007), Hall et al. 
(2013), and Strazzera et al. (2012). 
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Aitken et al. (2008) challenge Ôthe view often expressed in the extant literature that 
opposition groups are a major factor in the failure to meet wind power development targetsÕ 
(2008: 795). Analysing a protest campaign and government discourse surrounding a 
windfarm application in Scotland, they argue that though community objectors influenced the 
rejection of plans by the local authority, their concerns became marginalised at the public 
inquiry stage, leading Aitken et al. to conclude that Ôopposition groups can slow down, but 




Because Aitken et al. clearly challenge the widespread assumption that local 
opposition is a key influence on wind energy planning decisions, their conclusions warrant 
serious consideration. However, what is not clear from their research is the ways in which 
objectors managed to influence the decisions of local authorities and to what extent we might 
consider protestors to be influential in cases where planning permission is ultimately refused. 
The suggestion that local objectors are Ônot soÕ influential may potentially shape the 
approaches of both government and industry towards affected communities. It is therefore 
desirable to illuminate the mechanisms, types and extent of local objector influence. To do 
so, we shall compare four diverse cases of anti-windfarm protest in England.
3
 However, first 
we shall consider the implications of research into local protest against other types of 
infrastructure. 
Local environmental protest 
The forms of local environmental protest vary, from Ôradical social movementsÉ[to] broad 
coalitions of groupsÕ, but usually involve Ôsmall local groups campaigning against a specific 
locally unwanted land useÕ (Carter 2007, 155). Research into local environmental protest has 
focused on describing and explaining different ÔstagesÕ of community mobilisation, where the 
emergence (Gould et al. 1996; Rootes 1999; Carmin 1999; Futrell 2003), development 
(Lichterman 1996; Rootes 2007) and outcomes (Walsh et al. 1997; Baggott 1998; Rootes 
2009) of protest have variably featured in analyses.  
Of particular interest in the literature on local environmental protest in the UK is  
comparative research into anti-incinerator protest (Rootes 2006; 2009). Rootes argues that 
waste incinerator siting decisions can be explained in terms of a complex mix of factors 
relating to political agency and socio-political context and structures. The latter include the 
socio-economic structures of local communities, the political geography of local authorities, 
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 In subsequent articles, Aitken (2009, 2010) has discussed the way public inquiries privilege ÔexpertÕ rather 
than ÔlayÕ knowledge. 
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 It should be noted that Aitken et al.Õs case was in Scotland. Although the regimes governing onshore wind in 
England and Scotland are similar, the political context differs, principally because of the ambition of the 
Scottish government to achieve 100% renewable energy by 2020. This may help to explain the higher rate of 
approval of wind infrastructure in Scotland, but the approval rate there, even under the present SNP government 
(Toke et al. 2013, 62), is only modestly higher than in England; geographic factors, such as ScotlandÕs lower 
population density and greater incidence of windy locations, might suffice to explain the difference. Although 
Aitken et al. do not claim that their single Scottish case is representative of the UK or even of Scotland, theirs is 




and the stability of policy context as key explanatory factors. Among factors relating to 
political agency, the relationship between the strategy and types of arguments utilised by 
activists is key.  
The focus on strategy and political geography is particularly relevant for 
understanding the dynamics and impacts of anti-windfarm protest. Rootes draws attention to 
a two-pronged strategic approach on the part of local anti-incinerator campaigns, the first 
geared towards mobilising local communities as a means of putting political pressure on local 
decisionmakers, the second involving direct discursive engagement of campaigners with 
planners in order to persuade them to reject developersÕ plans. The ways in which protestors 
frame their arguments are central. Local communities are more likely to be successfully 
mobilised when protestorsÕ arguments avoid Ôabstract and over-complexÉuniversalising 
discourseÕ, and instead Ôfocus on particular local concerns and valuesÕ (Rootes 2006, 191), 
primarily because such arguments relate to peoplesÕ specific localities and highlight direct 
and easily comprehensible threats (Rootes 1999: 293-4). In directly engaging planning 
authorities, neither universalistic nor particularistic arguments guarantee success, but, in the 
absence of any local arena in which to challenge settled national policy, the prospects are 




If campaignersÕ strategies are important, so too is political geography.  In England, 
planning decisions on waste are made by Ôfirst-tierÕ local authorities (county and unitary
5
 
councils). Waste incinerators are more readily sited in county council jurisdictions because 
counties are much more geographically extensive than unitary council areas, with the result 
that elected county councillors are less likely to suffer the political consequences of 
approving locally unpopular technologies, particularly when those technologies are sited at a 
considerable distance from most councillorsÕ constituents (Rootes 2009, 881). Thus 
contentious infrastructure planning decisions are made by elected councillors with one eye on 
the ballot box, and are shaped by a Ôpolitical logicÕ influenced by political geography. 
Such political logic is also important to understanding the outcomes of local 
resistance to windfarms. Although wind energy planning decisions are, with certain 
exceptions (see below), made by Ôsecond-tierÕ local authorities (district councils), political 
logic complements considerations of strategy, as it is the political logic of councillors 
dependent on re-election that protestors aim to invoke when they seek to mobilise 
communities to object to proposals. In relation to wind energy outcomes, political logic 
relates less to the variability in the geographical extent of constituencies, and more to the 
extent of community mobilisation that local activists can secure. This point will become 




 Cf. Rootes (2013) on the conditions of success of local campaigns. 
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 Usually in geographically compact conurbations, unitary authorities combine the functions elsewhere 
discharged by Ôfirst tierÕ (county) and Ôsecond tierÕ (district) councils.	
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In order to analyse the key dynamics of local protest and the extent to which community 
campaigns shape local attitudes and planning decisions concerning proposed windfarms, the 
investigation was based on comparative analysis of four purposively selected cases of local 
anti-windfarm campaigns in England Ð two in which proposals were approved, and two 
where wind developments were rejected; three resulted in public inquiries, one of which 
found in favour of the developer, and two of which resulted in refusal of planning permission.  
The four cases are located in the south and east of England, two in Kent (Romney 
Marsh and Dover), one in Oxfordshire (Westmill), and one in Cambridgeshire (Boxworth). 
These cases were chosen because they represent some of the variety of wind energy 
controversies; there are notable differences between these four cases in terms of the kinds of 
campaigns waged by opponents and supporters of wind developments, the processes through 
which planning disputes were resolved, and the outcomes. No four cases can encompass the 
full range of contention over wind energy facilities in England but, by examining four 
sufficiently different cases, we hope to illuminate what for us is the central question: what 
influence do local campaigns have upon decisions concerning the siting of windfarms. 
Because it exceeded 50MW, the Romney Marsh development qualified as Ônationally 
significant infrastructureÕ, and therefore required Ôdevelopment consentÕ from the Secretary 
of State (Smith 2014: 3). This contrasts with the Ôplanning permissionÕ required from local 
authorities in our other three cases, which fall below the 50MW threshold. The Westmill 
windfarm involved cooperative ownership, a type of ownership that appears to have 
encouraged high deployment rates in Denmark and Germany (Toke et al. 2008). Both the 
Romney Marsh and Westmill developments gained planning permission, granted by the local 
authority at Westmill, and after a public inquiry at Romney Marsh.  
By contrast, Boxworth was selected as it provided an example of a well-organised 
campaign that culminated in planning permission being refused by the local authority and 
following a public inquiry. Finally, the Dover case was decided after a public inquiry that 
was triggered when the developer appealed on grounds that the planning authority had failed 
to reach a timely decision. This campaign, on-going at the time of selection, provided an 
opportunity to study an evolving situation, conduct follow-up interviews and attend a public 
inquiry.   
Data for the comparative analysis of cases was collected by means of semi-structured 
interviews and analysis of documentary evidence. Twenty-four semi-structured interviews 
were conducted, either face to face or by telephone, with key stakeholders (11 activists, 2 
developers, 2 landowners and 9 government officials). Extensive use was also made of 
government records, activist literature, press articles and developersÕ publications. 
Limitations of space preclude detailed presentation of interview data or analysis of 
documents, but the account that follows draws extensively on that data.
6
 The descriptive and 
explanatory analysis that follows will be centred on the dynamics and impacts of protest, but 
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the roles of other actors involved in each expression of contention (e.g. developers) will be 
considered. 
Description of cases 
Romney Marsh 
Because the 59.8MW Little Cheyne Court windfarm qualified as a Ônational infrastructureÕ 
project, the developer Ð National Wind Power Limited (NWP)
7
 Ð in November 2002 
submitted a planning application, not to the district council, but direct to the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry. Local opposition to the proposal began several months prior to 
submission when the developer failed to allay local fears through a public engagement 
strategy that involved working closely with residents living closest to the proposed 
development and organizing public meetings within the wider locality. Because the site was 
partly located within the boundaries of a parish (the third and lowest tier of English local 
government), members of the nascent Romney Marsh Windfarm Advisory Action Group 
(RMWAAG) began to utilize existing parish council networks to mobilize other local lower-
tier councils to submit objections to the proposal to the planning authority, Shepway District 
Council (SDC).
8
 Though the schemeÕs size meant the decision ultimately lay with national 
government, the Secretary of State was statutorily obliged to consult SDC, within whose 
boundaries the development was situated. SDC received notable objections to the 
development, not least from Kent County Council, English Nature, and 14 local lower-tier 
(parish and town) councils. Although SDC planning officers recommended approval of the 
scheme, the development control committee (DCC), which consists of elected councilors, 
rejected the application in August 2003, citing negative impact on landscape and birdlife, 
reflecting concerns raised by members of the nascent action group as well as key statutory 
agencies, not least English Nature. 
As a result of SDCÕs decision, the Secretary of State called a public inquiry, which 
began in October 2004. Leading up to this, RMWAAG increasingly focused on mobilizing 
members of the local community alongside other lower-tier councils. By the time of the 
Inquiry, where it secured Rule 6 party status
9
, RMWAAG claimed to represent 20 lower-tier 
councils and 1500 named supporters. It also managed to raise from wealthy local donors the 
funds necessary to hire legal representation. Among other things, the group argued against 
the scheme on the basis of negative impact on landscape, birdlife and the effects of noise and 
shadow-flicker on residentsÕ health. 
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 Shortly after the submission of the application NWP became Npower Renewables Ltd. In 2008 Npower 
Renewables became RWE Innogy.   
8
 Two core members of RMWAAG worked within this parish council; one lived in one of the houses closest to 
the proposed development. 
9
 Rule 6 status refers to those parties other than the appellant and defendant, in this case Npower and SDC 
respectively, seeking actively to participate in a Public Inquiry. Rule 6 status confers the right to receive, and the 
obligation to submit, proofs of evidence available to all parties; it is usually accorded by the relevant case officer 
to any interested organisation that requests it, but Ôit is unusual for ÒRule 6 statusÓ to be granted to individualsÕ 
(Planning Inspectorate 2014, para 2.1).	
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In addition to these local developments, the campaign developed a national 
dimension, with prominent figures and groups lining up on either side of the contention, and 
attracting national media interest. Opposing the scheme, then local MP and Conservative 
Party leader Michael Howard, and the naturalist David Bellamy, were the most prominent 
individuals, alongside organizations such as the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and English Nature. Supporting the 
development, were national organisations such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the 
Green Party. That the Romney Marsh proposal attracted such prominent figures and groups at 
least in part explains the interest of the national media, which at times portrayed the case in 
terms of a schism within the green movement (The Independent 2004), a division also 
reflected in local media, where voice was consistently given to both supporters and opponents 
of the scheme.  
Westmill 
The Westmill windfarm was the brainchild of a local organic farmer, who, in the early 1990s 
began to consider a cooperatively-owned windfarm on his land near Swindon. After two 
failed attempts, the farmer teamed up with National Wind Power and Baywind Energy Co-
operative. In September 2001 a planning application, which was an amendment to a 
previously successful application, was submitted to Vale of White Horse District Council 
(VWHDC) for five 1.3MW wind-turbines. Though planning officers recommended qualified 
approval of the scheme, in October 2003 the CouncilÕs DCC initially refused the application 
by a vote of 8 to 7. However, at a meeting a year later, in light of additional information and 
new government planning guidance (PPS22), the Council approved the scheme by 9 votes to 
8.  
Though there had been little public concern prior to 2001, the amended application 
stimulated formation of a local campaign group, Vale Environmental Concerns (VEC), to 
Ôdirectly fight the schemeÕ. The most prominent member of a core group of six was another 
local organic farmer who also ran a project for autistic children close to the proposed 
development site. Concerned about noise, landscape and the impact on the autistic children, 
VEC leafleted the two most affected local communities, organized public meetings and a 
website, secured 100 formal members, and forged links with local groups (parish councils, 
the National Trust and a gliding club). In addition to hiring an environmental consultant, paid 
for by members of the core group, to inform a rebuttal document submitted to VWHDC,
10
 
VECÕs key strategy focused on raising a petition and encouraging locals to formally object. 
The Westmill case also triggered the emergence of a pro-wind campaign Ð 
Windpower Over Westmill (WOW) Ð in February 2003 to counter what it considered the 
dissemination of misinformation by VEC. The group focused on raising awareness about the 
positive aspects of the scheme (e.g. in relation to climate change) and encouraged local 
residents to write letters of support to the Council. WOW also promoted a Friends of the 
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 A rebuttal document is a direct response to a developerÕs planning application and environmental statement 
that sets out the case why an application should not be approved. 
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Earth petition in support of the project, and informed people of positive results of a survey 
carried out by Oxford Brookes University.  
Both campaigns were at their most active leading up to the CouncilÕs first decision, 
which led to formal submission of significant expressions of local support and opposition. 
During this period, both campaigns also sought to broadcast the message via local media, 
whose reporting on the contention was objective and consistently balanced. Both sides 
pointed to the political nature of decisionmaking within the council as the decisions changed 
from one meeting to another, with voting mostly along party lines.  
Boxworth  
In August 2004, Your Energy submitted a planning application to South Cambridgeshire 
District Council (SCDC) to site a 16-turbine windfarm on the outskirts of the village of 
Boxworth, near Cambridge. The developerÕs plans stimulated strong local community 
opposition, leading to a sustained campaign.  
Stop Cambridge Wind Farm (StopCWF) was formed in summer 2004, after Your 
Energy, prior to submitting its application, sought to engage locals through a public 
exhibition and meeting, and a coach trip to a windfarm in Hull. The events, though well 
attended, did not allay the concerns of many locals, but stimulated greater opposition, the 
windfarm trip exacerbating localsÕ concerns when the developer restricted the dissemination 
of information to other residents on the coach during the trip.  
As part of its initial activities, StopCWF sought strategic advice from the anti-
windfarm group No Windfarms at Parham, and subsequently developed a well-organised 
campaign involving a formal paying membership that grew to 1650, dissemination of 
information via a website, leafleting, email and numerous public meetings, facilitated by a 
representative in each local village. In addition to hiring planning consultants to inform a 
rebuttal document submitted to the Council, StopCWF encouraged hundreds of local 
residents to formally object, systematically lobbied lower-tier councils and local authority 
councillors, appeared on local radio, and kept the local media, which generally reported 
favourably on the campaign, informed on developments.  
Though StopCWF sought to mobilise public opinion against the proposal, Your 
Energy was confident that many people supported the project, and to provide evidence asked 
people in Cambridge to sign letters supporting the scheme, with the result that hundreds were 
sent to SCDC.   
In March 2005 the SCDC DCC accepted the planning departmentÕs recommendation 
and refused the application on the basis of landscape impact, radar interference, noise, road 
safety and wildlife issues. At this point the contention subsided, but six months later the 
developer lodged an appeal. A planning inquiry was subsequently set for mid-October 2006.  
StopCWF then reinvigorated its campaign, securing the necessary funds to hire a 
barrister for the Inquiry, where the group appeared as a Rule 6 party. The Inquiry ended on 3 
November, with the Inspector dismissing Your EnergyÕs appeal on the basis of negative 
9	
	
effects on local landscape, noise impact and road safety. Having raised some £40,000 during 
its campaign, StopCWF claimed victory. 
Dover 
The application to develop a Ôwind parkÕ, consisting of five 120-metre turbines with installed 
capacity of approximately 10MW, at East Langdon, North Dover, was submitted by 
Ecotricity in September 2007. Ecotricity made no attempt to engage the local community 
beyond a public exhibition in the local village hall and Dover town library. 
Dover District Council (DDC) planners considered this a highly complex application, 
and sought advice from expert planning consultants to help assess the impact of the scheme. 
On receipt of this advice planning officers concluded Ôthat further information was necessary 
to enable the proposal to be properly assessed and a sound decision to be reachedÕ and 
requested further information from Ecotricity in December 2007 and February 2008.  
Instead of supplying the requested information to DDC, in April 2008 Ecotricity 
lodged an appeal on grounds that DDC had failed to reach a decision within the statutory 
timeframe. A planning inquiry was scheduled for early 2009. In the meantime, DDC received 
hundreds of letters opposing the scheme, and formal objections from numerous lower-tier 
councils; its DCC on 5 June held an ÔExtraordinary MeetingÕ which agreed that, due to the 
appeal and a lack of information, it was unable to determine the application but stating that it 
Ôwould have been minded to refuse planning permission on the grounds of inadequate and 
insufficient information and of the likely environmental effectsÕ. DDC subsequently voted to 
set aside £250,000 to fight the appeal at the public inquiry.  
Langdon Action Group (LAG) was formed by a group of eight residents after locals 
called a public meeting to consider the proposed application. Soon after the meeting the 
group contacted and sought advice from the leader of StopCWF, who acted as a paid strategic 
consultant. The LAG campaign therefore followed a similar path to that of the Cambridge 
group in terms of community mobilisation, establishing a paying membership base, lobbying 
local councillors, and encouraging formal objections to the local authority. Campaign funds, 
£36,000 in total, were used to hire planning experts to inform a rebuttal document, rent a 
helicopter to demonstrate the height of the turbines, and employ a barrister for the Inquiry. 
The group also established communication channels with the local media, who gave 
favourable coverage to the campaign.  
The Inquiry was held between 7 January and 10 February 2009. LAG appeared as a 
Rule 6 party alongside others opposing the scheme. In April the planning inspector dismissed 
the appeal on the basis of threat to air safety, negative landscape impact, and noise and 
shadow-flicker due to the siteÕs close proximity to a high density of dwellings.  
Insert 





Analysis of outcomes 
In order to explain the outcomes in the four cases, it is useful to divide the analysis into two 
stages relating to different levels of decision-making: local authority and public inquiry 
decisions. Outcomes at each stage varied. At the local authority stage, the Westmill 
application was approved, while those at Romney Marsh, Boxworth, and North Dover were 
not. At the public inquiry stage, Romney Marsh was approved, while the developersÕ appeals 
at Boxworth and North Dover were rejected. How can we begin to explain these outcomes?  
In terms of local authority planning decisions, the dual strategic approach (Rootes 
2009) is a feature of each case: local citizens sought to shape local authority planning 
decisions, by mobilising support within local communities to put political pressure on local 
councillors, while at the same time directly engaging planning officials and elected 
representatives in efforts to persuade them to reject applications.   
Direct arguments and local authority outcomes 
Of the two strategies, the impact of direct discursive engagement is more difficult to assess, 
mainly because of the difficulty of separating the impact of protestorsÕ arguments from the 
inputs of the numerous agencies, many of whose concerns mirror those of local activists, that 
planners consult as part of the planning process. The evidence in these cases suggests that 
political pressure is more decisive in influencing councillors than direct discursive 
engagement.   
Local authority planning decisions are made in light of extant planning criteria 
relating to the suitability of sites for development, and we can therefore expect arguments in 
line with such criteria to have a greater impact on outcomes. Interestingly, each group put 
forward arguments pertinent to planning criteria (e.g. landscape, proximity to dwellings, road 
and air safety, and ecology) and generally avoided non-material and universal arguments. Yet 
in spite of this consistency the recommendations of planning officers and planning 
committees varied: planning officers recommended approval of schemes at Westmill and 
Romney Marsh, yet recommended refusal at North Dover and Boxworth; and committees 
refused schemes at Romney Marsh, Boxworth and North Dover, while VWHDC eventually 
approved the scheme at Westmill.  
One explanation for this variation could relate to the means of representation and 
concomitant quality of arguments. Here it is worth noting that, unlike the leaders of 
RMWAAG, who each wrote individual letters to Shepway District Council, VEC, LAG and 
StopCWF all submitted professionally informed rebuttal documents to their respective local 
authorities that, in at times highly technical terms, detailed problems based on established 
planning criteria with the proposed developments. However, though this variation might 
arguably help to explain the differences between planning officersÕ recommendations 
concerning Romney Marsh, and North Dover and Boxworth, it cannot help explain why 
officers recommended approval at Westmill in spite of a rebuttal document. It also cannot 
11	
	
account for outcomes of decisions by planning committees at Westmill and Romney Marsh, 
where in the former case plans were eventually approved though a rebuttal document was 
submitted, while in the latter plans were rejected though activists only wrote letters. This 
variation clearly suggests that direct discursive engagement by protest groups was not 
decisive in influencing local authority decisions.  
The recommendations of planning officers reflect technical judgements based upon 
considerations of site suitability judged in relation to national planning guidelines and 
informed by the inputs of numerous agencies. Clearly, planning officers came to different 
technical judgements about the suitability of sites in our four cases. However, the decisions of 
planning committees, which consist of locally elected councillors, appear to be influenced by 
factors other than technical judgements of site suitability. Here we are led in the direction of a 
consideration of the Ôpolitical logicÕ of planning decisions. This in turn brings us to the issue 
of the mobilisation of local communities. Here, a far stronger case can be made for the 
influence of community protest on local authority planning decisions.  
Mobilisation and local authority outcomes 
Mobilisation efforts, levels of public support and opposition, and planning outcomes varied 
across our cases. However, there are some patterns within this variety that provide evidence 
of successful mobilisation, and of the ability of mobilisation to influence planning decisions. 
Each campaign group emphasised comprehensible local threats (to landscape, health, and / or 
house prices) in its campaign material, thus helping to maximise mobilisation potential, and 
efforts to mobilise the general public, either for or against developments, were generally 
successful.  
Numbers of letters of objection or support are at best crude measures of the extent of 
community hostility to or support for a planned development, but they do provide a rough 
indicator of the success or otherwise of the mobilising efforts of the contending parties. At 
Westmill, both campaigns saw high levels of public support and opposition communicated to 
the council in the form of letters (145 in support, 229 against), petitions (1127 signatures in 
support, 297 against) and surveys.
11
 At Boxworth, mobilisation efforts on behalf of Your 
Energy led to 705 letters of support, while the StopCWF campaign secured 512 letters of 
opposition and objections from 14 parish councils;
12
 the LAG campaign at North Dover 
attracted 800 letters and objections from 15 parish councils. Where less effort was made to 
mobilise, levels of public expression were far lower: at North Dover, where Ecotricity made 
no effort to engage the public beyond statutory consultation, only 4 letters of support reached 
the council; at Romney Marsh, RMWAAGÕs inter-council networking produced 14 lower-tier 
council objections, but its focus was on mobilising councils rather than citizens, and 
NpowerÕs focus more on community engagement than mobilisation, and levels of individual 
opposition and support remained comparatively low: 48 and 53 letters respectively.  
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70% in favour; two parish councils voiced opposition, while three supported. 
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 Only two parish councils voiced support/raised no objection at Boxworth.	
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Broadly speaking, then, relative success in mobilising local communities 
corresponded with efforts to mobilise. But what were the impacts of these different levels of 
mobilisation on local authority planning decisions?  
Though the level of citizen opposition/support is not unimportant, the factor that 
seems to have the greatest influence on planning decisions is the level of lower-tier council 
opposition/support. The impact of lower-tier councils can most readily be seen in the 
Boxworth and Romney Marsh cases where letters of support outnumbered objections, the 
planning committees unanimously voted against the applications.
13
 At Boxworth, the DCC 
unanimously supported planning officersÕ recommendations, yet at Romney Marsh the 
planning committee unanimously voted against planning officersÕ recommendation. Thus 
planning officersÕ recommendations do not appear decisive. However, where the ratio of 
lower-tier council opposition to support was high (14:1 at Romney Marsh and 14:2 at 
Boxworth) plans were unanimously refused. This suggests that the influence of lower-tier 
council opposition on local authority decisions is strong (Cf. Toke 2005), probably because 
parish councils are democratically accountable and are presumed by district councillors to be 
representative as well as legitimate whereas ad hoc campaigns are not.  
If lower-tier councilsÕ opposition can be seen to explain outcomes at Romney Marsh 
in spite of other potentially significant factors, then the impact of citizen opposition/support 
can most readily be seen at North Dover, where two waves of mobilisation by LAG, and 
EcotricityÕs minimal effort to engage the public, resulted in limited support and significant 
discontent communicated to the local authority. DDCÕs inclination to reject the proposal 
reflected this weight of local public opinion: at its Extraordinary Meeting to decide the issue, 
the Council noted the Ôvery significant risksÕ associated with Ônot opposing the applicationÕ 
given Ôa very high level of third party oppositionÕ, specifically the Ô800 letters of public 
representationsÕ. It therefore seems likely that political logic influenced DDCÕs decision, and 
that political logic was stimulated by high levels of citizen opposition.  
If Romney Marsh and North Dover demonstrate the power of different expressions of 
local opposition to shape outcomes, then Westmill highlights the potential of other factors, 
notably political values, to influence decisions. The Westmill case saw significant levels of 
local opposition and support for the scheme communicated by lower-tier councils, individual 
letters, petitions and surveys, and this might appear to explain the close voting on the DCC 
(initially 8 to 7 against, then finally 9 to 8 in favour).
14
 However, this must be considered 
alongside the role of political values, as voting within the DCC predominantly followed party 
political lines between pro-windfarm Liberal Democrats and anti-windfarm Conservatives. 
Here, the fact that public opinion was divided likely provided a degree of confidence that 
constituents would not be alienated if councillors voted according to political values. The 
																																								 																				
13
 It should be noted that SCDC planning department at Boxworth gave less weight to many of 705 letters 
received in support of the development as they were pro-forma letters from people outside the immediate 
locality.  
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	It is likely that many of the signatories to the Friends of the Earth petition were from outside the immediate 
communities; the high numbers compared to the locally focused VEC petition can therefore largely be 
discounted in terms of impact on the local authority.  
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interaction of political logic with political values can also be seen at Boxworth and Romney 
Marsh. In these cases planning committees unanimously voted against schemes in spite of 
significant variation in the party political make-up of DCCs, an outcome explained earlier in 
terms of high levels of lower-tier council opposition. These three cases add weight to the 
conclusion regarding the political logic of decision-making: when cost-benefit calculations 
suggest limited political fall-out (Westmill), political values may come into play; when such 
calculations indicate electoral risk (Boxworth and Romney Marsh), political survival trumps 
political values. 
We have seen that the direct discursive arguments of protestors were not decisive in 
shaping outcomes, yet consideration of the political pressure brought to bear on elected 
planning councillors via mobilisation does provide evidence of protestor influence, albeit 
influence mediated by the lowest and most accessible tier of government. Political values can 
be seen to shape decisions when opposition does not significantly outweigh support.  
Having considered the impact of community activism on local authority planning 
decisions, we now focus on the relationship between activism and outcomes at planning 
inquiries. In the three cases that went to Inquiry, each campaign group secured Rule 6 party 
status, hired legal representation and sought to influence decisions via direct discursive 
engagement and the power of argument. Analysis of planning inquiry reports at Romney 
Marsh, Boxworth, and Dover suggests that the role of local protestors might be more 
significant than sceptics such as Aitken et al. argue. 
Direct arguments and planning inquiry outcomes 
The cases that RMWAAG, StopCWF and LAG presented at public inquiries predominantly 
spoke to material planning considerations (landscape, health, proximity, cultural heritage, and 
road and air safety). This is no surprise given the input that StopCWF and LAG received 
from expert planning consultants, and that all three groups hired specialist barristers to 
represent them at inquiries.  
The impact of local campaigners seems to have been most limited at Romney Marsh, where 
in spite of explicitly acknowledging the validity of RMWAAGÕs concerns over noise and 
visual amenity, the planning inspector approved the development, arguing that Ônone of the 
various impacts are so forceful as to outweigh the benefits of the schemeÕ. Indeed, the only 
discernible impact of RMWAAG in this case seems to have been a technical concession 
relating to the positioning of turbines. By contrast, at Boxworth and North Dover, planning 
inspectors made explicit reference in their reports to the validity of campaign group 
arguments, a number of which were reflected in the reasons why applications were not 
approved. At Boxworth, the planning inspector agreed with StopCWFÕs concerns about road 
safety and visual impact, both of which were reasons for rejecting Your EnergyÕs appeal, 
while at Dover, the planning inspector concurred with LAGÕs concerns over the developerÕs 
noise measurements and noise impacts, which were among the stated reasons for rejecting 
EcotricityÕs appeal.   
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At Romney Marsh and Dover therefore, it seems that local protestors had some 
impact on decisions at public inquiries, but the extent of such influence is difficult to 
determine because in both cases the concerns expressed by the two campaign groups were 
also raised at the planning inquiries by more significant actors, not least the local authorities. 
This was largely reflected in the inquiry reports, where planning inspectors often discussed 
protestor concerns alongside those of local authorities. Thus though it is certainly not the case 
that local campaign groups were ÔmarginalisedÕ at public inquiries, their impact on decisions 
was most likely limited to reinforcing the arguments of more powerful actors. 
Concluding discussion 
We have sought here to address a noted gap in the existing literature on socio-political 
responses to proposed windfarms. By drawing on other research on local environmental 
protest, we have considered the dynamics and impacts of four cases of local anti-windfarm 
protest. This analysis has been carried out against the backdrop of Aitken et al.Õs contention 
that the influence of local opposition groups on planning outcomes is limited and superficial.  
Local anti-windfarm groups invested significant time and energy in resisting developments, 
and shared similar campaign strategies, not least, the mobilisation of communities and direct 
discursive engagement with decision-makers. In terms of community mobilisation, local 
groups adopted similar practices to shape local attitudes and encourage active involvement. 
Among others, these included leafleting communities, organising public meetings, setting up 
websites and email databases, regularly communicating with an established support base, 
lobbying local councillors, establishing networks with other local groups, channelling 
messages through the media, and fundraising. Many of these activities were aided by the 
availability of resources (voluntary labour, organisational skills, office equipment) embedded 
within pre-existing community networks (Crossley 2002) Ð friendship groups, families, 
parish councils Ð  and were instrumental in encouraging local citizens and lower-tier councils 
to formally object to proposals, and, through these objections, attempt to influence local 
authority decisions. The fund-raising activities of local groups not only facilitated many of 
these other activities (e.g. printing flyers, hiring venues), but also provided the means to hire 
planning expertise to inform the direct arguments made to local authorities and barristers to 
represent them at public inquiries. In terms of direct arguments, though it is not clear whether 
local groups had a decisive impact at the local authority level, there is evidence of community 
concerns carrying some weight at public inquiries.  
At the very least, it is difficult to conclude that groupsÕ concerns were marginalised at public 
inquiries, and, subsequently, that their impact was limited and superficial, particularly at 
Boxworth and Dover. Indeed, even if concerns had been marginalised at this latter stage, and 
had planning inspectors made the same decisions regardless Ð which is likely given local 
authority opposition Ð local protesters would still have been instrumental actors in the events 
leading up to planning inquiries and final decisions to refuse planning permission. 
It is often difficult to determine beyond question the influence of objectors upon local 
councilsÕ planning committees and officers because influence is typically exerted over a long 
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time, often informally and mediated by other social interactions, and is at best incompletely 
documented. The members of planning committees are elected politicians and so are 
susceptible to a variety of pressures and lobbying, but the role of planning officers is to guide 
councillors to reach decisions that are defensible in law and so to avoid the costs to local 
taxpayers of appeals and public inquiries, including, where appeals succeed, the legal costs of 
the appellant. Planning officers are guided by planning law, practice, precedent and national 
guidelines, and insofar as objectors may influence planners, it is principally by bringing to 
their attention facts that are relevant but which an initial case officer report may not have 
taken into account, or they may introduce new perspectives that may problematize officersÕ 
initial views (e.g. concerning the value of a landscape).
15
 Moreover, although planning 
officersÕ reports are largely technical, their recommendations inevitably entail an element of 
non-technical interpretation and judgement, and it is this that objectors may seek to influence. 
Whilst it is true that, as Aitken et al. observe, national policies have an Ôuntouchable statusÕ 
insofar as the merits or otherwise of those policies are not relevant considerations for 
planners or a public inquiry, the interpretation and local implementation of national policies 
are very much matters for public inquiries, and it is here that effective representation of 
objectorsÕ views may influence outcomes. 
For all that it is useful, for analytic purposes, to distinguish two stages in decisionmaking, 
local council decisions and public inquiries are not simply two separate processes operating 
according to different rules. Although the game may appear to be reset at the public inquiry 
stage, objectors, planning authorities and their officers, their legal representatives Ð and 
sometimes the appellant Ð will have been engaged in a complex learning process, much of it 
invisible to the outside observer. To conclude, as Aitken at al. do, that public inquiries 
marginalise local objectors and deprive them of voice is surely to exaggerate the extent to 
which the public inquiry process is inhospitable to lay objectors to developments such as 
wind energy infrastructure, and to minimise the significance of the influence objectors may 
have more directly exerted at earlier stages of the planning process. Just because the impacts 
of community mobilisation are often indirect and mediated does not mean that they are 
insignificant.  
From the evidence presented here, it is apparent that some groups have a clear understanding 
of, and the resources to implement, the strategies required to maximise chances of achieving 
their aims. That such groups have this understanding derives partly from the advice of 
planning experts and specialist barristers hired to inform and fight their cases, and partly from 
the diffusion of strategic advice among anti-windfarm groups themselves. In some cases their 
strategic efforts prove successful; in others, less so. Nevertheless, these groups are clearly 
significant actors in the contentious politics surrounding planning decisions over windfarms.  
Proper understanding of the significance of public concern is important because different 
conclusions may influence the direction of policies and practices of government and industry 
towards local communities. With the introduction of the UK wind industryÕs Communities 
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but included StopCWFÕs entire rebuttal document in the appendix to his report 
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Benefits Protocol (RenewableUK 2011), the governmentÕs recommendations and Action Plan 
on community benefits and engagement (DECC 2013), and the industryÕs revised protocol in 
response to these prescriptions (RenewableUK 2013), community concerns are clearly taken 
seriously, not least in the commitment to give communities earlier and greater say in 
decision-making processes, and increasing compensation to communities hosting 
developments. How this might influence the future exploitation of wind energy in England is 
a matter for conjecture, but the pressure to develop new infrastructure to meet renewable 
energy targets is likely only to increase. More locally contentious cases will arise, and with 
the budgets of local planning authorities under increasingly severe pressure, the mobilisation 
of local communities is likely to play an increasingly important role in the scrutiny of 
development proposals. Whether or not they are effective in determining the outcomes of 
proposed wind energy developments, local objectors seem likely to be an enduringly 
important part of the process. 
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Table 1. Summary of anti-windfarm cases: key names, dates and decisions. 
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